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Abstract. Historical regions remain the most common basis for the formation or promotion of 
regional identities in Europe. However, regions and regional identities are in the process of con-
stant formation and can change significantly in line with new conditions. In this paper we focused 
on the changes of the spatial spread of identities with historical regions in Ukraine in compari-
son to the initial boundaries of those. The results show that identities with historical regions are 
markedly adapting to modern administrative boundaries. At the same time, the symbolic value of 
historical regions constitutes an essential element of identity building in contemporary adminis-
trative regions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Europe has always been the continent of regional identities (Applegate, 1999). 
During the last three decades, Europe experienced a particularly dramatic in-
crease in the role of regions as economic, cultural, and administrative units, 
growth of their material and symbolic capital. Regions receive more and more 
resources and powers transmitted from the state level; they increasingly be-
come subjects of international relations and a competitive struggle (Keating, 
1998; Boisen et al., 2011; Terlow, 2012) . In some cases (Catalonia, Scotland, 
Flanders, etc.), developed political regionalism leads to separatism, threatening 
the integrity of the existing states. That is why the question of regional identity, 
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its essence, sustainability, and the role in the formation and reproduction of the 
regions remains at the top on the agenda.
Researchers in European regionalism started to pay more attention to ethnic and 
socio-psychological aspects rather than to political centres and regimes (Rokkan 
and Urvin, 1982). Schmitt-Egner (2002) outlined the understanding of a region as 
a historical landscape with collective historical memories. Historical regions, i.e. 
areas characterised by socio-cultural (including ethnic, ethnographic or linguistic) 
unity and/or limited to political or administrative boundaries in the past, remain 
the most common basis for the formation or promotion of regional identities in 
Europe. The European decentralization experience allows us to consider identi-
ty as an instrument of regional integration. At the same time, there are several 
options for the correlation of the grid of such historical regions and the modern 
administrative system: the boundaries of historical regions can be fixed by the ex-
isting administrative division (e.g. federal lands in Germany, autonomous regions 
in Spain), partly taken into account (voivodeships in Poland) or ignored (Czechia, 
Ukraine). In the last example, such regions may exist informally without officially 
recognised names, boundaries, institutions, and symbols.
Ukraine is one of the few major European countries where the administrative 
division, inherited from the Soviet era and, as in most post-socialist states, aimed 
at the development of a centralised state (Yoder, 2003), ignores the boundaries of 
large historical regions. Most researches dealing with the regionalisation issue in 
Ukraine applied to the political differentiation and electoral patterns, focusing on 
explaining regional differences using cultural and/or socioeconomic factors (Birch, 
2000; O´Loughlin, 2001; Barrington and Herron, 2004; Yakymenko and Lytvynen-
ko, 2006; Clem and Craumer, 2008; Barrington and Faranda, 2009; Melnykovska, 
Schweickert and Kostiuchenko, 2011; Liashenko and Putrenko, 2011; Osipian and 
Osipian, 2012; Katchanovski, 2014). Then, the influence of historical regions and 
borders remains definitely underestimated. However, in recent years, some works 
were published explaining the effect of “phantom borders” on the current social 
structure and political regionalisation. The analysis performed by Jelen and Dostál 
(2017) partially confirmed the existence of phantom boundaries in Ukraine’s polit-
ical and cultural-demographic aspects. Peisakhin (2013) shows differences in po-
litical views and other life attitudes along the historical border of the Austrian and 
Russian empires, dividing historical regions of Galicia, Bukovina, Volhynia, and 
Podolia. Gentile (2017) also studied the influence of former political borders on po-
litical and ideological division in Ukraine; however, he revealed local peculiarities 
of geopolitical orientations among citizens of Luhansk and Stakhanov criticizing the 
total homogenisation of Ukrainian regions (Gentile, 2015). By studying the symbols 
and monuments in two villages on opposite sides of a historical border in Western 
Ukraine, Löwis (2017) questioned traditional statistical correlations between elec-
toral and linguistic or historical maps and shed light on the ambivalence of spaces 
of identification and the ties that those village communities entertain with history.
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Since Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991, there were repeated 
calls for a change of the existing administrative division by consolidating existing 
first-level administrative units (oblast) or creating additional macro-regional level 
of governance (Popovkin, 1993; Zastavnyi, 1994; Dorohuntsov and Fedorysche-
va, 1996; Dolishniy et al., 1997; Palamarchuk and Palamarchuk, 1998; Dolishniy, 
Kravtsiv and Symonenko, 2002; Symonenko, 2002; Dotsenko, 2003; Pistun and 
Melnychuk, 2010; Oliynyk et al., 2015). It is worth noting that the network of his-
torical regions was taken into account, to a greater or lesser extent, in determining 
the names and boundaries of the new macro-regions proposed. Some researchers 
associate the success of the decentralisation reform in Ukraine with the success of 
the formation of new local identities (Kotenko and Tkachuk, 2016).
Significantly, the Ukrainian national administrative-territorial system could be 
compared to the EU NUTS system in this way. At present, the first-level units 
(oblasts) are comparable to NUTS 2; the second-level units (raions) are signifi-
cantly smaller in terms of population than standard NUTS 3 units, but the con-
solidation of raions, which brought them into line with the NUTS 3 standard, has 
already begun in the framework of the on-going decentralisation reform. Howev-
er, there are currently no NUTS 1 regions (with a population of 3 to 7 million) in 
Ukraine. This gap could be filled just by creating a macro-regional level, includ-
ing on the basis of historical regions.
Leaving the economic and political feasibility of such regional consolidation 
out of the framework of this paper, we may, however, pose a question: how jus-
tified and adequate is equating of the proposed macro-regions with the historical 
ones? Are historic regions a real basis for creating a network of new macro-re-
gions, or are they just phantoms that may not be taken into account? And if they 
really exist, then what their essence is, including the actual limits. After all, the 
facts suggest that regions and corresponding identities are in the process of con-
stant formation and cannot be tightly bound to one “correct” identity or to a spe-
cific historical period (Paasi, 1986a, 2002; Gilbert, 1988; Murphy, 1991). The 
“old” identities with historic regions can change significantly in line with new 
social, political, and economic conditions, increasingly combining both tradition-
al and new elements that determine their dynamic and network character, tempo-
rariness of configuration, orientation rather on the needs for future development 
than on the historical tradition (Terlow, 2009, 2012; Terlow and van Gorp, 2014). 
Paasi (2001) expressed the opinion that the European regions are more likely to be 
the result of actual regionalisation processes than historical and cultural entities. 
Thus, the real perception of historical regions by their inhabitants is in question 
(Vaishar and Zapletalová, 2016). Moreover, while local identities formed on the 
basis of personal experience and individual contacts, regional identities require 
indirect communication between people by means of the media, political parties 
or other social institutions (Anderson, 1983), and, therefore, are strongly related 
to these institutions.
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Chromy et al. (2004), investigating regional identity in Czechia, came to the 
conclusion that the traditional historical regions are quite stable in the collective 
memory, but this statement does not apply to certain parts of their borders: the 
cores of historical regions are clearly defined, while their external boundaries are 
unclear. In fact, the outer boundary of the identity with a historical region is often 
coinciding with modern administrative boundaries. Šerý and Šimáček (2012), as 
well as Vaishar and Zapletalová (2016), came to a similar conclusion. Studying 
historical regions of Małopolska (Lesser Poland) and Śląsk (Silesia) and similar-
ly-named present-day voivodeships, Nowak (2018) concluded that old cultural 
and historical divisions are still important for the people, but the possible econom-
ic advantages seem to prevail. A recent study in Ukraine showed that the majority 
of the population of the three administrative oblasts retains self-identification with 
historic regions (Melnychuk and Gnatiuk, 2018). Simultaneously, in some areas, 
due to an alignment of a certain administrative region with a certain historical 
region in the public discourse, the spread of identity with another historical region 
(which had nothing in common with the area) takes place. The authors named 
such identities as hybrid because they combine both traditional and new elements 
of identification. A similar phenomenon on a smaller spatial scale was also noted 
in Czechia (Vaishar and Zapletalová, 2016). Turning back to Ukraine: Gomaniuk 
(2016) found that the historical region of Tavria/Taurida is nowadays publicly 
linked predominantly to only one modern administrative region (Kherson oblast).
How universal is this phenomenon? The answer requires testing considering 
more historical regions and in a wider spatial context. Therefore, the purpose of 
this paper was to determine the changes of the spatial spread of identities with 
historical regions in Ukraine in comparison to the initial boundaries of these re-
gions, as well as to clarify the role of the current administrative division in this 
transformation.
2. DATA AND METHODS
Ukraine is one of the largest countries in Europe, located within several natu-
ral regions and relief macrostructures. For a long time, the territory of Ukraine 
was divided between neighbouring states, being cut by interstate borders. Each 
of these states had its own administrative system, often stable for several centu-
ries. Due to differences in geographical locations, conditions, and availability of 
resources, different parts of the country have different economic specialisations. 
All these factors (landscape diversity, political fragmentation, persistent historical 
administrative division, and the differences in economic specialisations) created 
the prerequisites for the formation of large historical regions of different origins.
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For the analysis, we selected 7 historical regions of Ukraine: Galicia, Podolia, 
Volhynia, Bukovina, Slobozhanschyna, Polesia, and Donbas. The first five regions 
from this list are political ones, that is, they existed in the past as the relevant ad-
ministrative units or were separated from the rest of the country by state borders. 
Polesia is primarily a landscape region, represented by the zone of mixed forests, 
and never existed as a separate administrative or political unit. Donbas is an eco-
nomic (industrial) region shaped on the basis of the Donetsk coal basin. However, 
political and industrial regions have certain cultural (ethnographic, in particular) 
specificity of the local population, as well as landscape features, which are often 
expressed in macro-relief toponymy (Podolian and Volhynian Uplands, Donets 
Ridge, etc.). Thus, there are many criteria for delineating the borders of a region, 
and all of them are important for the formation of regional identity (Keating, 2004; 
Zuefle, 2004). As a rule, regional boundaries, drawn according to different criteria 
(political, ethnographic, natural, economic), do not coincide. Thus, a historical 
region does not have unambiguously defined borders; instead, one may identify 
the core of the region where most of the criteria are fulfilled, and the peripheral 
part, where only some of them are true.
Therefore, in order to define the boundaries of historical regions for this re-
search, we proceeded from the basic genesis of a region (political, landscape, or 
economic). In the case of political regions, we tried to outline relatively the most 
stable boundaries of an area once included into the respective administrative units.
Thus, we used the following boundaries of historical regions:
1 . Galicia: stable boundaries of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria as part of 
the Habsburg Monarchy, the Austrian and Austro-Hungarian Empires (1772–1918).
2 . Podolia: maximum limits of Podolian (1434–1793) and Bratslavian (1566–
1793) voivodeships of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Podolian Gov-
ernorate of the Russian Empire (1797–1925).
3 . Volhynia: maximum limits of the Volhynian voivodeships of the Pol-
ish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1566–1795), the Volhynian Governorate of the 
Russian Empire (1795–1925) and the Volhynian voivodeship of Poland (1921–
1939).
4 . Bukovina: borders of the Duchy of Bukovina within the Habsburg Monar-
chy (1849–1918).
5 . Slobozhanschyna: borders of 5 Sloboda Cossack regiments (1651–1765).
6 . Polesia: limits of the landscape zone of mixed forests.
7 . Donbas: boundaries of the Donetsk Coal Basin (roughly coinciding with 
the limits of the Donetsk industrial region).
The boundaries and names of modern first-level administrative units (oblasts 
and cities with special status) are shown in Fig. 1. The modern administrative 
system practically does not take into account the boundaries of historical regions, 
although it reflects some historical boundaries of the 20th century (e.g. the state 
borders between the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania in 1920–1939)
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Unquestionably, a direct population survey could provide the most exact and 
precise data on actual regional identity. However, the labour and time-consuming 
nature of this method pushed us to use the so-called regional identity markers – ar-
tifacts, sociofacts, and mentifacts, indirectly indicating how people identify with 
a place or region, enabling one to study the present state, and (if several time sec-
tions available) the dynamics of identity, including its spatial patterns. In literature, 
identity markers are often defined as characteristics or attributes used by people 
to distinguish one area from another (Simon et al., 2010). These markers could be 
different kinds of place names, names of private enterprises and institutions, lo-
cal media, trademarks and brands, commemorative signs dedicated to famous local 
personalities or important historical events, spatial behaviour of people, including 
movement of goods and information across the territory (mainly various non-gov-
ernmental services), residential patterns of local sports teams’ fans, electoral be-
haviour patterns, etc. In particular, the role of toponymy as a regional identity mark-
er was clarified in numerous theoretical and empirical contributions (e.g. Guyot and 
Seethal, 2007; Pavliuk, 2007; Botolv, 2009; Jordan, 2010, 2012; Bucher et al., 2013; 
Woodman, 2014; Weaver and Holtkamp, 2016; Gnatiuk, 2018; etc.).
Thus, in this study the current limits of the spatial spread of identities with his-
torical regions were defined using such identity marker as ergonyms – the names of 
private enterprises and institutions. This category of place names constitutes a dy-
namic subsystem of toponymy, representing a strong link to the present state of 
regional identity and allowing tracing its temporal changes. The feasibility of ergo-
nyms in regional identity studies was tested by Melnychuk et al. (2014). A compari-
son of those results with the results of a direct sociological survey in three Ukrainian 
oblasts (Melnychuk and Gnatiuk, 2018) proved a high reliability of this marker: 
the areas where respondents identified with a certain historical region, in general, 
coincided with the areas of continuous distribution of the corresponding ergonyms.
The on-line directory of Ukrainian enterprises and organizations UA-REGION 
(https://www.ua-region.com.ua/) was used to create the database of ergonyms. 
The database included ergonyms derived from the names of selected historical 
regions: actual names of regions, basic adjective forms and regional identifica-
tions of the inhabitants. Only names given by free choice of the owner or the 
management were selected for the analysis. In particular, we eliminated official 
names of executive authorities, local self-governments and communal (munici-
pal) enterprises, as their origin is explained by administrative factor only. Such 
restrictions were extremely important in cases when the name of a historical or 
landscape region corresponded to the name of a contemporary administrative unit 
(e.g. historical Volhynia and modern Volhyn oblast; region of Polesia and Poliskyi 
raion in Kyiv oblast, etc.)
The database was checked and cleared of any repeating and doubtful items. 
Then each ergonym was linked to respective administrative units (oblasts and 
raions). The following indicators were calculated on the basis of the database:
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1 . Representation (R) – the percentage of ergonyms associated with the histor-
ical regions, from the total number of ergonyms in the area (by raions).
2 . Coefficient of territorial coverage (K
Cov
) – the proportion of administrative 
raions with ergonyms associated with this historical region (by oblasts).
3 . Coefficient of concentration (K
Con
) – the percentage of ergonyms associated 
with the given historical region, concentrated in given oblasts (by oblasts).
The assumption was that the presence of ergonyms, semantically related to 
a certain historical region, pointed to the identity of the local inhabitants with 
a region. Mind you, those who identify with a historical region (as well as the cor-
responding ergonyms) may concentrate also in the basic destinations of migrants 
from the region concerned, first of all in large cities (Melnychuk et al., 2014).
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Comparison of the territories of historical regions with the spatial pattern of the 
corresponding ergonyms (Fig. 2), as well as the calculated coefficients K
Cov 
and 
K
Con
, (Fig. 3), indicated certain changes in the territorial distribution of identitifi-
cation with historical regions. In particular:
1. The vast majority (91.3%) of Podolia-related ergonyms are concentrated
in two oblasts – Khmelnytskyi and Vinnytsia, and are almost uniformly dis-
tributed throughout their territories, including those parts that never belonged 
to Podolia: the northern part of the Khmelnytskyi oblast, which historical-
ly always belonged to Volhynia, and the north-eastern part of the Vinnytsia 
oblast, which pertained to the Kyiv (Middle Dnieper) region. Podolia-related 
ergonyms are also evenly distributed throughout the territory of the Ternopil 
oblast, except for its northern Volhynian part, but their representation is rather 
low, with the exception of the extreme south-east, formerly a part of the Podo-
lian voivodeship. However, Podolia-related ergonyms are virtually non-exist-
ent in other oblasts partially covered by the historical Podolia, namely north 
of the Odessa oblast, west of the Cherkasy and Kirovohrad oblasts, and south-
west of the Kyiv oblast.
2. More than 90% of all Volhynia-related ergonyms are concentrated within
one modern region – the Volhyn oblast, and are roughly uniformly distributed 
throughout its territory. Also, such ergonyms are present in the southern part 
of the Rivne oblast and the northern part of the Ternopil oblast. All those 
territories were part of the historical Volhynia. However, these ergonyms are 
practically absent in other Ukrainian areas covered by the historical Volhynia, 
including in the Zhytomyr oblast, as well as in the northern part of the Khmel-
nytskyi oblast.
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3 . Galicia-related ergonyms are concentrated (90.8%) in three oblasts: Lviv, 
Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil, and are evenly distributed across their territories, 
with the exception of the northern part of the Ternopil region, which historically 
belonged to Volhynia.
4. Almost all Bukovina-related ergonyms (80.2%) are located within the 
boundaries of the Chernivtsi region and are evenly represented in both its histori-
cal parts, belonging to Bukovina and Bessarabia respectively.
5. The main area of Slobozhanschyna-related ergonyms roughly coincides 
with the historical limits of the five Sloboda Cossack regiments, namely in the 
north and the centre of the Kharkiv oblast, the south of the Sumy oblast and the 
north of the Luhansk oblast. However, they also exist in the rest of the territories 
of the first two oblasts, which historically did not belong to Slobozhanschyna. 
Together, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Luhansk oblasts gather more than 90% of Slobo-
zhanschyna-related ergonyms.
6. The distribution of Polesia-related ergonyms, in general, coincides with 
the limits of the mixed forest zone, but there are certain deviations. Correspond-
ing ergonyms are evenly distributed throughout the Zhytomyr and the Chernihiv 
oblasts, including their southern forest-steppe parts. However, in the Kyiv and the 
Sumy oblasts, the southern boundary of their distribution almost coincides with 
the boundaries of natural zones, and in the Rivne oblast the majority of ergonyms 
is concentrated in its northern part with a lack of Volhynia-related ergonyms.
7. Donbas-related ergonyms are generally confined to the territory of the Do-
netsk Coal Basin. However, they are also present in adjacent areas, in particular 
scattered throughout the whole Donetsk oblast and the northern part of the Lu-
hansk oblast.
Based on these findings, three types of areas can be distinguished for each 
historical region:
1. Status Quo areas: territories belonging to given historical region in the past 
and retaining a sufficiently strong identity with it.
2. Lost areas: territories that belonged to a historical region in the past, but lost 
(or have been losing) the corresponding identity, including cases when people 
began to identify with other historical region.
3 . Gained areas: territories that did not belong to a historical region, but devel-
oped (and gradually strengthen) the identity with it.
Fig. 4 represents the status quo areas, lost areas, and gained areas for each of 
the historical regions analysed. Those are rather generalised synthetic schemes not 
based on accurate calculations at the level of raions and neglecting local trends, 
which sometimes differ significantly from the general picture. However, these 
schemes clearly show the last century’s tendencies of changing the boundaries of 
areas where identities with historical regions are observed. They demonstrate that 
identities associated with different historical regions existed in different circum-
stances due to the pattern of modern administrative divisions. Historical regions
Fig. 2. Comparison of the territory of historical regions with the distribution areas of the corresponding ergonyms
Source: own work.
Fig. 3. Calculated coefficients KCov and KCon, for historical regions by oblasts
Source: own work.
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Fig . 4. Changing spatial patterns of the identities with historical regions
Source: own work.
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may experience a) a significant spatial gain (Slobozhanschyna, Bukovina), b) an 
increase with some areas while simultaneously losing the others (Podolia, Don-
bas, Polesia), and, c) a significant spatial reduction (Volhynia, Galicia).
The revealed tendencies indicate that certain oblasts, under certain favourable 
conditions, are experiencing a process of unification, or homogenisation, i.e. the 
spread of identity with a certain historical region over an entire oblast. In other 
words, there is a matching between the identification with a given oblast and the 
identification with a historical region. For example, identification with Podolia 
has spread throughout the Vinnytsia and the Khmelnytskyi oblasts; identification 
with Bukovina covers the entire Chernivtsi oblast; identification with Polesia is 
more or less typical for the entire Zhytomyr and Chernihiv oblasts, etc.
Thus, all oblasts of Ukraine can be divided into 2 groups:
1. Anchor regions, which grasp the identity with a particular historical region,
while identities with other historical regions, if any, disappeared or have been in 
the process of disappearing.
2. Swing oblasts, where identities with several historic regions continue to coexist.
After redrawing the administrative system in the first half of the 20th century, 
virtually all regions had a diversified structure of identity with historic regions. 
However, with time, some of them experienced a process of unification (modern 
anchor oblasts), while others retained the initial diversity (modern swing oblasts). 
The likelihood of a unification scenario was stimulated by the following factors:
Factor 1: Initial predominance of identity with one historical region within an 
oblast. This means that one, and only one, historical region covered the vast ma-
jority of the oblast territory.
Factor 2: An oblast centre is located within the limits of initially dominating 
historic region, covering the most part of the oblast.
Factor 3: Semantic link of the name of an oblast and/or oblast centre with the 
name of a certain historical region.
Based on Table 1, all anchor regions were influenced by at least 2 of these factors, 
while the effect of only one factor is insufficient to induce a unification scenario.
Table 1. Types of oblasts* and their factor conditionality
Oblast Identity with historical region Type Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Chernivtsi Bukovina Anchor + + -
Volhyn Volhynia Anchor - + +
Khmelnytskyi Podolia Anchor + + + / - **
Vinnytsia Podolia Anchor + + -
Lviv Galicia Anchor + + -
Ivano-Frankivsk Galicia Anchor + + -
186 Oleksiy Gnatiuk, Anatoliy Melnychuk
Oblast Identity with historical region Type Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Kharkiv Slobozhanschyna Anchor + + -
Donetsk Donbas Anchor + + +
Zhytomyr Polesia Anchor + + -
Chernihiv Polesia Anchor + + -
Rivne Volhynia / Polesia Swing - + -
Sumy Slobozhanschyna / Polesia Swing - + -
Luhansk Donbas / Slobozhanschyna Swing - + -
Ternopil Galicia / Podolia / Volhynia Swing - + -
Kyiv Polesia / possibly Middle Dnieper Swing - - +
* Only those oblasts that can be confidently classified as anchor or swing according to 
available data are specified.
** Until 1954, the city of Kamianets-Podilskyi (i.e. “Podolian Kamianets”) was the oblast centre.
Source: authors’ analysis.
What will happen to swing oblasts in the future? There are two possible an-
swers: either their current state is metastable, or there is a process of unification, 
drifting into one of the historical identities, although much slower than in anchor 
oblasts. The answer to this question may vary in each particular case, since it 
depends on the complexity of various factors. However, we are likely to suppose 
a slow unification process in most of the swing regions. It happens because one of 
the identities has an advantage over the other due to one of the factors. Most often 
this is the location of the regional centre in the area of one of the dominant his-
torical identities. Proceeding from this, it is possible to foresee the strengthening 
of the identity with Volhynia in the Rivne oblast and the identity with Slobozhan-
schyna in the Sumy oblast. Also, we could expect the enhancement of the identity 
with Donbas in the Luhansk oblast, but after its division into the Russian-occu-
pied south (including the oblast centre) and the Ukrainian north, the drift of the 
northern part to identify with Slobozhanschyna is more likely. As for the Kyiv 
oblast, its status of a metropolitan region and the semantics of the regional centre 
name contribute to the strengthening of identity rather with Kyivschyna/Middle 
Dnieper than with Polesia. The most difficult situation took shape in the Ternopil 
oblast due to the competition between the three identities, none of which has ob-
vious advantages; although the area of the identity with Volhynia in the northern 
part appears to be the weakest side in this “confrontation”, it does not disappear 
(like in the neighbouring Khmelnytskyi oblast) since neither of the other two iden-
tities haa a monopolistic symbolic domination in the rest of the territory, including 
the oblast centre.
However, the case of the Rivne oblast is more complicated than it seems. The 
fact is that the neighbouring Volhyn oblast, by its very name, exclusively binds the 
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“brand” of Volhynia, making other oblasts “not entirely Volhynian”, which forces it 
to seek an alternative identity. The toponymic factor may work also in other cases. 
For example, Donetsk, as a regional centre, ties the Donbas “brand” to the respec-
tive oblast (Donbas = Donetsk Basin), worsening the prospects of this identity in 
the Luhansk oblast. If the Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast, after changing the regional 
centre in 1954, was not renamed into the Khmelnytskyi oblast, the same factor could 
weaken the identity with Podolia in the neighbouring Vinnytsia oblast.
Thus, in some cases, the process of unification can acquire the extreme form 
“one historical region = one administrative region”. In that case, if some oblasts 
monopolise brands of historical regions, others are forced to seek a fundamen-
tally new regional identity. This identity can hypothetically be based on historic 
regions of a smaller scale, but also local economic specialisation, geographical 
situation, landscape features, etc. In fact, current rethinking of Polesia takes place 
according to exactly such a model.
What acts as the engine of unification in certain, specified above, favourable condi-
tions? The authors believe that two factors are important: 1. a socio-psychological incli-
nation to perceive objects like integral and unambiguous phenomena; 2. the influence 
of a socialisation process by means of institutions, primarily the media and education.
Speaking of the socio-psychological aspect, we assume two things. First, it 
seems that Gestalt psychology (see, e.g. Lehar, 2003) has a point here and people 
tend to consider spatial units (regions) as integral categories. According to Odehnal 
and Šerý (2012), regional boundaries play an important role in shaping regional 
identity: helping to define the limits of a region, they help people perceive it. Histor-
ical regions in Ukraine are informal, and not only the average citizen, but even an 
expert may have a problem with defining them clearly. Simultaneously, the bound-
aries of modern administrative regions are clearly defined landmarks convenient for 
the mental approximation of other spatial structures. Secondly, it is a universal psy-
chological inclination of human beings to formulate the unequivocal hierarchical 
correspondence between spatial taxa. People are prone to unequivocal correlations 
such as “oblast k belongs to region A”, or “region B includes oblasts m and n” (ide-
ally – “region C = oblast p”). The situation whre the statement “oblast p partially 
belongs to region А” and “oblast p partially belongs to region B” are valid at the 
same time, makes a dissonance to this harmonious hierarchy; therefore, people be-
gin to prefer one of these statements in favour of which more arguments are found.
Meanwhile, the quality of this argumentation depends on the second factor, 
namely, the socialisation process. Paasi (2009) admitted that the fact of belonging 
to a region is not obvious for the majority of the population. The most objective 
and unbiased information about the boundaries of historical regions comes almost 
exclusively from the elites, including geography and history experts. This infor-
mation is disseminated mainly in academic literature, it is rarely voiced in the 
media, and therefore, it is not widely known to the general public. In addition, it 
is ambiguous, difficult to comprehend, and therefore uncomfortable for everyday 
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use. Instead, the mass media present a simplified, unambiguous look at things, 
representing the position of regional authorities, using identity with one or an-
other historical region as a brand of the administrative unit. Since uniqueness and 
awareness are important for every brand, in the case of several alternative identi-
fication options, officials, knowingly or unknowingly, are more likely to choose 
one with more arguments to account for. The three above-mentioned factors of 
unification typically play a role of such arguments. 
National geographical and historical education, in particular, schemes of economic 
and socio-geographical regionalisation set out in school and university textbooks, also 
should be considered. The importance of bilateral relationships between identity and 
education policies at different levels and in various contexts were depicted, e.g. in con-
tributions by Hega (2001), Brown (2005), Măduţa (2014), Li (2016), etc. The study of 
the politics of school textbooks in the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Luhansk oblasts in Ukraine 
(Rodgers, 2006) revealed how education can frame political views in those regions. 
Even fiction is important: the representations of four Ukrainian cities in fictional narra-
tives by contemporary authors show a stressed sense of belonging to the local territory, 
which is conveyed to the readers (Rewakowicz, 2010). In our case, since administra-
tive oblasts are considered as regionalisation units, the historical differences within 
the oblasts are neglected, so that whole oblasts are included into a particular unit. As 
a result, such schemes stimulate the equation of administrative oblasts with a specific 
region. For example, a very popular scheme of economic regionalisation, presented 
in school geography textbooks, contains the Northwest region enclosing the Volhyn 
and the Rivne oblasts. In that mode, the Rivne oblast is linked to the Volhyn oblast 
(and hence to the historical Volhynia) and separated from the Zhytomyr oblast (i.e. 
from Polesia). We assume that regionalisation schemes may promote the formation 
of fundamentally new regional identities in the absence of historically grounded al-
ternatives, for example, the formation of Prydniprovya based on the homonymous 
economic region enclosing the Dnipropetrovsk and the Zaporizhia oblasts.
Electoral and geopolitical regionalisation is also a significant factor for 
Ukraine, a country located at a geopolitical fault-line and undergoing permanent 
political crisis. Relevant newsbreaks constitute an integral part of the every-
day practices of ordinary Ukrainians and may influence the shaping of regional 
identities. For example, the Ternopil oblast is traditionally treated as a part of 
the Western Ukraine electoral region, and Galicia is traditionally considered the 
core region of Western Ukraine. Accordingly, the Ternopil oblast is considered 
by the mass media mainly as a part of Galicia. Simultaneously, according to 
the peculiarities of natural conditions and economic development, the Ternopil 
oblast is included in the Podolian economic region. This dichotomy produces 
two co-existing contradictory messages (“the Ternopil oblast is Galicia” and 
“the Ternopil oblast is Podolia”), which leads to the spread of both identities 
throughout the oblast and, at the same time, does not allow them to increase 
substantially as a result of mutual competition. 
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Proceeding from the universal psychological base for unification, this phenom-
enon should not be limited to Ukraine. Why, then, Ukraine appears to be such 
a good example? In our opinion, the optimal (for the revealed effect) ratio of 
the size of historical regions and modern administrative units (oblasts) is quite 
important. After all, if modern administrative regions are very small compared 
to the historical ones, one historical identity will sharply dominate among the 
new regions. Accordingly, the change of identity as the result of a unification will 
occur only in limited areas, so the overall transformation of the spatial pattern 
of historical identities will be negligible. If, however, new regions are too large 
(comparable in size to the historical ones), the existing differences in historical 
identity within the new regions could be a major obstacle of unification. Never-
theless, this is an assumption requiring further verifications.
Moreover, the process of unification is facilitated by the absence of other iden-
tities (linguistic, religious, ethnic, racial, etc.), which, being clearly assigned to 
specific regions, may significantly strengthen regional identification. Ukraine, by 
European standards, is a diversified country in terms of regional cultural traits. But 
in the continental part of the country, such differences are rather gradual changes 
with small gradients. Among the historical regions considered in this paper, Gali-
cia is the only exception: its inhabitants in the overwhelming majority are Greek 
Catholics, while the inhabitants of the adjacent Ukrainian lands (Volhynia and 
Podolia) are predominantly Orthodox. Therefore, it is indicative that the area of 
identity with Galicia practically did not change its limits; it is noteworthy how the 
Orthodox north of the Ternopil oblast retains its identity with Volhynia.
A situation similar to that of Ukraine is observed in Czechia, where modern 
administrative units since 1949 have not been consistent with the boundaries of 
the historical regions (Bohemia, Moravia, and Czech Silesia), new and historical 
regions are close to the optimal size ratio, and the identity with the historic regions 
has an exceptionally cultural and ethnographic character (Vaishar and Zapletal-
ová, 2016). In view of that, it is significant that our results are viewed with the 
results of the Czech authors cited at the beginning of the article. In our opinion, in-
teresting results can also be obtained in France, where the modern administrative 
division into departments and regions is not always consistent with the boundaries 
of historical provinces.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The example of Ukraine proves that the historical regions and the associated 
identities are not something consistent, determined once and for all. Instead, 
they are dynamic structures transforming over time, changing their boundaries 
and adapting to new (geo)political, economic, social, and cultural realities, in-
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cluding to the current administrative division. In fact, the names of historical re-
gions function as labels, which may hide a substance significantly different from 
the original meaning when the corresponding historical region was first shaped. 
Regional identity can be relatively freely chosen, since in modern conditions 
it is no longer firmly attached to cultural peculiarities, as well as to historical 
political and administrative boundaries. Of course, some of these boundaries 
are fairly stable, as their influence has been tracked for many centuries. But 
there are no fundamental obstacles for the formation of quasi-historical regions 
on fundamentally new grounds (modern territorial organisation of public ad-
ministration, political and economic processes, including their network forms). 
The task for a researcher is to establish which attributes of the regions are more 
persistent, and which are more dynamic, and under what conditions that persis-
tence/ dynamism is more likely to be manifested.
However, it is important that historical identities, in particular their symbolic 
attributes like name, coats of arms, and natural and cultural monuments, are wide-
ly used by modern administrative regions in own building their own identities. 
Modern administrative units, as formal structures with defined boundaries and 
functioning institutions, are becoming more and more important identification ob-
jects, but they do so largely due to their interaction with and integration into the 
network of historic regions. The factors and mechanism for assigning the brands 
of historical regions by the modern administrative units, as well as the formation 
of fundamentally new regions on the basis of geographic, economic or political 
criteria, is more or less understandable. However, a question remains, why for 
the authorities and the population it is so important to identify with something 
more than modern administrative units. Probably it is a desire to pull away from 
the modern administrative division as having no deep historical roots, being tem-
porary, and Soviet-rooted, and to identify instead with something more rooted, 
long-lasting, and with a gust of historical romance and symbolism. As Paasi and 
Zimmerbauer (2011) accurately pointed out, regional symbols often make it pos-
sible to combine the past, the present and future of a region, fill it with real con-
tent, and ensure legitimacy.
The dynamic and hybrid nature of identity with the historical regions provides 
additional arguments for both supporters and opponents of the administrative di-
vision reform at the macro-level. If the network of modern administrative units 
reflects the real identity more clearly than academically grounded regionalisation, 
the task of supporters is substantially simplified: it is only necessary to integrate 
existing administrative units correctly, not cutting them into parts (here it remains 
an open question what to do with the swing regions. Possibly lower level identi-
ties, their spatial cores and peripheries should be taken into account). However, 
opponents of the reform also receive a serious argument: why redesign the admin-
istrative map again if historical identities are successfully developed on the basis 
of existing administrative regions?
191Identities with historical regions – are they adapting to modern administrative...
In any case, it must be acknowledged that positioning modern administrative 
units in the context of a certain macro-region in a public discourse at a national, 
regional or local level is a powerful instrument of regional policy that can acceler-
ate or slow down the development of a new regionalism and direct this process in 
desired direction. Indeed, although regions cannot be considered as self-sufficient 
fixed formations and constantly change their configurations, the importance of the 
sense of place and identification with relatively stable and symbolically capacious 
territorial units remains and presumably will not disappear.
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